

Message Text

PAGE 01 NATO 06599 01 OF 08 271721Z

67

ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 AEC-05 CIAE-00 H-01 INR-05 IO-10

L-02 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-03 PRS-01 SAJ-01

SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 RSC-01 NSC-05 MC-01

OES-03 /089 W

----- 005509

R 271530Z NOV 74

FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9016

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USDEL MBFR VIENNA

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 8 USNATO 6599

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: WG PAPER ON AERIAL INSPECTION

REF: A) USNATO 6314; B) STATE 254639;

1. WE TRANSMIT BELOW FOURTH REVISED DRAFT OF AERIAL INSPECTION PAPER WHICH WG STAFF PREPARED FOLLOWING ON BASIS MEETING REPORTED REF A. MISSION OFFICER DISCUSSED WITH STAFF GROUP WASHINGTON COMMENTS (PARA 2, REF B) ON POSSIBILITY OF DEFEATING AERIAL INSPECTION BY TAKING ADVANTAGE OF ADVERSE WEATHER, AND STAFF GROUP HAS ATTEMPTED TO ACCOMMODATE U.S. POINTS IN PARA 5 B (1) OF NEW DRAFT.

2. PAPER WILL AGAIN BE CONSIDERED AT DECEMBER 3 WG MEETING. IN ACCORDANCE WITH REF B AND MODIFICATION OF PARA 5 B (1), WE WILL ACCEPT DRAFT TRANSMITTED BELOW.

SECRET

PAGE 02 NATO 06599 01 OF 08 271721Z

3. BEGIN TEXT:

MBFR NEGOTIATED INSPECTION - AERIAL INSPECTION

BACKGROUND

1. THE SPC ON 14TH JANUARY, 1974 ASKED (AC/119-R (74)4) THE MBFR WORKING GROUP TO STUDY FURTHER THE MATTER OF MANNED AIRBORNE INSPECTION.

2. AERIAL INSPECTION HAS ALREADY BEEN CONSIDERED IN PREVIOUS STUDIES.

A. REPORT OF THE VERIFICATION SUB-GROUP (AC/276-WP KUPLETKREVISED)) WHICH STATES THAT AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE COULD BE A VALUABLE ADJUNCT TO OTHER METHODS (OF VERIFICATION);

B. US REPORT ON VERIFICATION (US NATO(POL)/OUT/NS73-121) OF 5 TH OCTOBER, 1973. A SUMMARY OF THE SECTION DEALING WITH AERIAL INSPECTION IS AT ANNEX A TO THIS PAPER. THIS US REPORT GIVES THE MOST TECHNICAL INFORMATION ON THIS SUBJECT;

C. THE ACCEPTABILITY OF INSPECTION TO NATO SUDY (1) WHICH GIVES AN EARLY VIEW ON, INTER ALIA, RESTRICTIONS ON AIRBORNE INSPECTORS. AN EXTRACT FROM THE PAPER IS AT ANNEX B;

D. SHAPE STUDY ON AIRBORNE PHOTOGRAPHY(2). A COPY OF THIS PAPER IS AT ANNEX C.

3. THE MBFR WORKING GROUP HAS ALREADY STATED (3) THAT A MEASURE OF AERIAL INSPECTION WOULD ASSIST GROUND VERIFICATION AND THIS POINT HAS BEEN TAKEN UP BY THE SPC(4).

4.

A. THE WORKING GROUP CONSIDERS THAT THE MORE DETAILED PROBLEMS OF AERIAL INSPECTION CAN ONLY FINALLY BE ASS-ESSED WHEN CONCRETE REDUCTION AGREEMENTS HAVE BEEN CON-CLUDED. IN THIS RESPECT THE OBSERVATIONS OF THE WORKING GROUP MUST ALSO BE SUBJECT TO THEIR POLITICAL ACCEPTAB-ILITY. HOWEVER, THE WORKING GROUP BELIEVES THAT IT IS POSS-IBLE, DRAWING FROM THE MATERIAL ALREADY AVAILABLE, TO REACH A NUMBER OF CONCLUSIONS FROM WHICH THE NECESSARY MIL-ITARY AND TECHNICAL ADVICE FOR THE SPC CAN BE DRAFTED.

B. THE AIM OF THE PAPER IS THEREFORE TO ADVISE THE SPC:

(1) AS TO WHAT EXTENT AERIAL INSPECTION WOULD BE A USEFUL ADJUNCT TO OTHER MEANS OF VERIFICATION, IN PARTI-SECRET

PAGE 03 NATO 06599 01 OF 08 271721Z

CULAR TO A GROUND SYSTEM WHICH ITSELF WOULD BE A SUPPLE-MENT TO NATIONAL MEANS;

(2) AS TO WHAT IS THE BEST METHOD OF AIRBORNE INSPECTION TECHNICALLY AND MILITARILY.

VALUE OF AIR PHOTOGRAPHY

5. FROM THE MATERIAL AVAILABLE TO THE WORKING GROUP THE FOLLOWING CHARACTERISTICS OF AIR PHOTOGRAPHY CAN BE DE-DUCED:

A. AIR PHOTOGRAPHY COULD:

(1) PROVIDE BOTH COVERAGE OF LARGE AREAS AND HIGH DEFINITION PHOTGRAPHS OF PIN-POINT TARGETS;

(2) IDENTIFY MAJOR EQUIPMENTS, SUCH AS TANKS AND AIR-CRAFT WITH CONSIDERABLE ACCURACY, IF THEY ARE NOT EFFECTIVELY CAMOUFLAGED OR CONCEALED;

(3) IF INFRA-RED IS USED, SOMETIMES DETECT SUB-SURFACE INFORMATION AND INDICATE THE USE OF BUILDINGS. SOME TYPES OF CAMOUFLAGE ARE VULNERABLE TO INFRA-RED AND ITS FALSE COLOUR DERIVATIVE;

(4) PROVIDE INFORMATION, ON THE TYPE AND APPROXIMATE SIZE OF UNITS OCCUPYING BARRACKS OR ON THE MOVE, WITH REASONABLE ACCURACY;

(5) PROVIDE EVIDENCE OF LARGE-SCALE MILITARY MOVEMENTS AND CONCENTRATIONS;

(6) PROVIDE USEFUL NEGATIVE INFORMATION ON LACK OF MILITARY ACTIVITY.

B. LIMITATIONS AFFECTING AIR PHOTOGRAPHY INCLUDE:

(1) WEATHER: NORMALL WEATHER CONDITIONS (CLEAR SKY) ARE BETTER OVER THE EASTERN PART OF THE NGA THAN OVER THE WESTERN PART AND THEREFORE FAVOUR AERIAL INSPECTION BY THE ALLIES. NONETHELESS WEATHER CONDITIONS COULD BE A SERIOUSLY RESTRICTING FACTOR ON AERIAL INSPECTION AND ARRANGEMENTS WOULD NEED TO BE MADE FOR PLANNED FLIGHTS, WHICH HAD TO BE ABORTED, TO BE FLOWN AT ANOTHER TIME. THE CRITICAL TIME SPAN REQUIRED FOR SIGNIFICANT VIOLATIONS

SECRET

PAGE 01 NATO 06599 02 OF 08 271856Z

67

ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 AEC-05 CIAE-00 H-01 INR-05 IO-10

L-02 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-03 PRS-01 SAJ-01

SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 RSC-01 NSC-05 MC-01

OES-03 /089 W

----- 006897

R 271530Z NOV 74

FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9017

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USDEL MBFR VIENNA

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 8 USNATO 6599

OF AN MBFR AGREEMENT IS IN THE DOMAIN OF DAYS TO A FEW WEEKS: WHILST THERE COULD BE ROOM FOR DOUBT THAT A MAJOR BREACH OF AN MBFR AGREEMENT WOULD IN FACT BE

BASED ON AN ASSUMPTION OF BAD WEATHER BEING AVAILABLE TO COVER THE REQUIRED MOVEMENT, BAD WEATHER PERSISTENCE AND EVEN AVERAGE CLOUD COVER IN THE NGA MAKE PLAUSIBLE THAT VIOLATION COULD BE PLANNED ON THE BASIS OF WEATHER STATISTICS AND FORECASTS. HOWEVER, IT WOULD ALWAYS BE POSSIBLE FOR A VIOLATOR TO ATTEMPT TO AVOID DETECTION BY MOVING FORCES AT NIGHT.

BAD WEATHER CONDITIIONS CAN TO SOME EXTENT BE OVERCOME BY INFRA-RED EQUIPMENT, ALTHOUGH THIS IS SEVERELY DEGRADED BY CONDITIONS MORE ADVERSE THAN LIGHT MIST: TO PENETRATE THICK CLOUD RADAR WOULD BE REQUIRED(1);

(2) DARKNESS, WHEN IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO USE INFRA-RED OR LOW-LIGHT TELEVISION;

(3) THE SERVICEABILITY OF AIRCRAFT;

(4) IN THE MBFR CONTEXT, ACCEPTABILITY PROBLEMS PART-SECRET

PAGE 02 NATO 06599 02 OF 08 271856Z

ICULARLY IN ANY PHASE I LIMITED TO US/USSR FORCES ALONE;

(5) THE FREQUENCY OF FLIGHT PERMITTED;

(6) DECEPTION BY THE FORCES INSPECTED;

(7) INABILITY TO INSPECT CERTAIN AREAS WHICH WOULD BE DECLARED RESTRICTED BY THE INSPECTED COUNTRY;

(8) THE NEED INITIALLY TO BUILD UP A COMPREHENSIVE DATA BANK ON THE AREA TO BE COVERED. THE TIME REQUIRED TO DERIVE AN ADEQUATE DATA BASE DEPENDS PRIMARILY ON THE FREQUENCY AND EXTENT OF FLIGHTS NEGOTIATED, AND AT THE VERY BEST MIGHT TAKE CONSIDERABLE TIME;

(9) THE AMOUNT OF ADVANCE NOTIFICATION TO THE OTHER SIDE OF TIME AND ROUTING OF FLIGHTS THAT IS REQUIRED;

(10) SOME TYPES OF AIRRECONNAISSANCE COULD BE HIGHLY INTRUSIVE AND MIGHT BE UNACCEPTABLE TO THE NATION CONCERNED.

(1) THE TECHNICAL CONSIDERATIONS OUTLINED IN THIS LAST SENTENCE ARE NOT FOR DISCUSSION WITH THE EAST DURING NEGOTIATIONS.

6.

A. THESE CHARACTERISTICS INDICATE THAT AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHY COULD BE USED IN VERIFICATION, SUBJECT TO THE LIMITATIONS EXPRESSED IN SUB-PARAGRAPH 5.B ABOVE AND TO THE ACCEPTANCE BY THE WP OF THE HEIGHT, FREQUENCY, ROUTING AND CLEARANCE PROCEDURES REQUIRED TO IMPLEMENT EFFECTIVE INSPECTION ARRANGEMENTS, FOR:

(1) RAPID CHECKING OVER A WIDE OR SAMLL AREA OF INFORMATION PROVIDED BY MOBILE GROUND TEAMS OR OTHER SOURCES;

(2) INSPECTING WIDE AREAS AND SO HELP TO DIRECT MOBILE GROUND TEAMS OR OTHER SOURCES TO SUSPECT AREAS;

(3) PROVIDING PHOTOGRAPHIC EVIDENCE OF POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS WHICH MIGHT NOT BE AS READILY USUABLE IF OBTAINED BY NATIONAL MEANS;

(4) DEPENDING ON THE PREVAILING OPERATIONAL RESTRICTIONS,

HAVING SOME DETERRENT EFFECT ON VIOLATIONS.

B. IT HAS BEEN SUGGESTED THAT AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHIC INSPECTION MIGHT BE USED, IN CONJUNCTION WITH A SYSTEM OF GROUND INSPECTION AT NOMINATED BORDER CROSSING POINTS, TO VERIFY THAT FORCES DID NOT ENTER THE NGA AT OTHER THAN THESE NOMINATED POINTS AND DID NOT OTHERWISE CONTRAVENE AN AGREE-
SECRET

PAGE 03 NATO 06599 02 OF 08 271856Z

MENT WITHIN THE NGA. THE WORKING GROUP HAVE CONSISTENTLY TAKEN THE VIEW THAT, BECAUSE OF:

- (1) THE LIMITATIONS DESCRIBED IN PARAGRAPH 5.B ABOVE;
- (2) THE VULNERABILITY OF THIS SYSTEM TO FRUSTRATION BY THE OTHER SIDE;
- (3) THE NEED FOR PRECISE, PREFERABLY EYE-WITNESS, IDENTIFICATION AND/OR CONFIRMATION OF VIOLATIONS AS A BASIS OF EVIDENCE; ANY AERIAL INSPECTION SYSTEM, MUST BE REGARDED AS AN ADJUNCT TO GROUND INSPECTION OR OTHER MEANS OF MONITORING IN VERIFICATIONS. IF STATIC INSPECTION POSTS AT BORDERS WERE THE ONLY ACHIEVABLE FORM OF OVERT GROUND INSPECTION, THERE COULD BE SOME GAIN IN GENERAL INTELLIGENCE THROUGH AN AERIAL INSPECTION SYSTEM OPERATING TO COVER OTHER AREAS. RELIANCE COULD NOT BE PLACED ON AERIAL INSPECTION ALONE FOR DIRECT VERIFICATION OF VIOLATIONS OF AN MBFR AGREEMENT: EVEN GROSS VIOLATIONS (E.G. AT NIGHT) COULD GO UNDETECTED BY SUCH AERIAL INSPECTION.

TYPES OF SENSORS

7.

A. IN ADDITION TO THE VARIOUS TECHNIQUES OF AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHY INCLUDING MULTI-SPECTRAL BLACK AND WHITE, COLOUR AND IR/COLOUR PHOTOGRAPHY, INFRA-RED SENSORS MAY ALSO BE SUEFUL AND ARE AVAILABLE.

B. RADAR COULD BE USED FOR INSPECTION THROUGH CLOUD BUT THE RESULTING PICTURE WOULD NOT HAVE THE HIGH DEFINITION POSSIBLE WITH AIR PHOTOGRAPHY UNDER GOOD WEATHER CONDITIONS
(1).

C. EARLIER PAPERS (E.G. THE ACCEPTABILITY PAPER) CONSIDERED LOW ALTITUDED VISUAL INSPECTION FROM SLOW MOVING AIRCRAFT. THIS IS CONSIDERED VERY MUCH A SECOND BEST TO AIRBORNE PHOTOGRAPHY FOR COMPARABLE LEVELS OF EFFORT EXPENDED.

D. A FURTHER POSSIBLITY IS A LARGE CARGO HELICOPTER, FITTED OUT FOR PHOTOGRAPHY SIMILARLY TO THE TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT DISCUSSED IN PARAGRAPH 9. IT WOULD BE AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE GROUND INSPECTION SYSTEM, ADVERSARY FLOWN AND OPERATING AS AN "AIRBORNE MOBILE TEAM" COMPLETE WITH HOST OBSERVERS. THE FACTORS OF SECURITY, PARTICIPATION AND FLIGHT PLANNING WOULD APPLY. HOWEVER FLIGHTS WOULD NEED TO BE AS FREQUENT
SECRET

PAGE 04 NATO 06599 02 OF 08 271856Z

AS THE INSPECTORS REQUIRED.

8. THIS PAPER CONCENTRATES PARTICULARLY, THEREFORE, ON MEDIUM LEVEL AIRBORNE PHOTOGRAPHY. HOWEVER IT IS POINTED OUT THAT THE CONSIDERATIONS ON PROVISION OF AIRCRAFT, CREWS, INSPECTORS AND OBSERVERS ARE VERY SIMILAR WHATEVER THE TYPE OF SENSOR CARRIED.

(1) THE TECHNICAL CONSIDERATIONS OUTLINED IN THIS LAST SENTENCE ARE NOT FOR DISCUSSION WITH THE EAST DURING NEGOTIATIONS.

SECRET

PAGE 01 NATO 06599 03 OF 08 271903Z

67

ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 AEC-05 CIAE-00 H-01 INR-05 IO-10

L-02 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-03 PRS-01 SAJ-01

SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 RSC-01 NSC-05 MC-01

OES-03 /089 W

----- 007022

R 271530Z NOV 74

FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9018

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USDEL MBFR VIENNA

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

S E C R E T SECTION 3 OF 8 USNATO 6599

AIRCRAFT, CREWS AND CONTROL

9.

A. MANY TYPES OF AIRCRAFT HAVE THE REQUIRED SIZE, FLIGHT CHARACTERISTICS AND RANGE OF OPERATING ALTITUDES WHICH WOULD MAKE THEM USEFUL PLATFORMS FOR CARRYING OUT NEGOTIATED AERIAL INSPECTION MISSIONS(1). THE ACTUAL HEIGHT ENVELOPE TO BE CHOSEN BY THE INSPECTING NATION OR TO BE NEGOTIATED SHOULD BE RESTRICTED ONLY BY CONSIDERATIONS OF AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL, AIR SAFETY AND POLITICAL ACCEPTABILITY. WITHIN THESE LIMITS, THE OPERATING ALTITUDE SHOULD BE CHOSEN ON THE BASIS OF OPERATING EFFICIENCY AND MAXIMUM ACCESS TO THE AREAS AND SITED TO BE MONITORED.

B. THE AIRCRAFT WOULD HAVE TO BE MODIFIED FOR PHOTOGRAPHIC

MISSIONS WITH APPROPRIATE CAMERA MOUNTS, WINDOWS, OPENINGS IN THE FUELAGE ETC. IT MUST BE ABLE TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE POWER TO THE SENSORS FOR OPERATION AND CONTROL AND MUST BE LARGE ENOUGH TO ACCOMMODATE, IN ADDITION TO THE CREW,
SECRET

PAGE 02 NATO 06599 03 OF 08 271903Z

THE OPERATOR(S) AND OTHER ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL SUCH AS MEMBERS OF THE INSPECTORATE AND ANY HOST COUNTRY REPRESENTATIVES. AIRCRAFT ESPECIALLY DESIGNED OR MODIFIED FOR AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE OR MAPPING WOULD BE PARTICULARLY USEFUL.

C. SUCH AIRCRAFT ARE AVAILABLE WITHIN THE RESOURCES OF SOME OF THE ALLIES AND ONLY ONE AIRCRAFT, WITH A SECOND FOR BACK-UP PURPOSES, WOULD BE REQUIRED(2).

D. IN ORDER TO ALLOW FULL ALLIED PARTICIPATION IN AERIAL INSPECTION A SYSTEM OF MIXED CREWS FROM INTERESTED COUNTRIES IS TECHNICALLY QUITE FEASIBLE.

E. CO-ORDINATION OF AERIAL INSPECTION WOULD NEED TO BE BY THE SAME NATO BODY TASKED WITH THE CONTROL OF THE OVERALL VERIFICATION AND INSPECTION SYSTEM.

(1) ONE EXAMPLE OF SUCH AN AIRCRAFT OPERATED BY MOST OF THE ALLIES IS THE C130 HERCULES.

(2) NOTE. ONE AIRCRAFT AND A BACK-UP ARE MENTIONED AS ADEQUATE IN THE CONTEXT OF AERIAL INSPECTION BEING AN ADJUNCT TO A GROUND INSPECTION SYSTEM. IF IT WERE THOUGHT THAT AERIAL INSPECTION ON ITS OWN SHOULD BE EMPLOYED, AND THIS IS NOT ADVOCATED, A LARGER NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT WOULD BE REQUIRED. AN ILLUSTRATIVE CALCULATIONS, BASED ON THE FIGURES AND FORMULA IN APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX A TO AC/276-WP(74)5(4TH REVISE) USED FOR CALCULATING GROUND TEAMS, PRODUCES A REQUIREMENT FOR 10 TO 14 AIRCRAFT. THIS WOULD ALSO NECESSITATE STRONG BACK-UP INCLUDING SOME 30 EXPERIENCED PHOTO INTERPRETERS.

F. THE SAME NATO BODY COULD CARRY OUT THE TASK OF ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION OF THE INFORMATION OBTAINED. THERE WOULD NOT BE A PROBLEM SUCH AS THAT RAISED BY THE USE OF NATIONALLY OBTAINED INFORMATION.

G. IN ORDER TO MINIMIZE AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL PROBLEMS AND TO ENSURE THAT THE PLANNED AND APPROVED ROUTE IS BEING ADHERED TO, THE AIRCRAFT MAY HAVE TO FLY UNDER POSITIVE RADAR CONTROL OF THE HOST COUNTRY.

H. IF ADVERSARY AIRCRAFT WERE TO BE USED, HOST OBSERVERS WOULD BE NECESSARY.

INSPECTION OPTIONS

10. THROUGHOUT THE REMAINDER OF THIS PAPER THE TERMS "HOST" AND "ADVERSARY" RECUR. IN THE CONTEXT OF THIS PAPER THESE
SECRET

PAGE 03 NATO 06599 03 OF 08 271903Z

WORDS ARE DEFINED AS FOLLOWS:

A. "HOST". THIS MEANS THE COUNTRY AND/OR FORCES BEING INSPECTED.

B. "ADVERSARY". THIS MEANS THE COUNTRY AND/OR FORCES CARRYING OUT THE INSPECTION.

11.

A. OPTION 1

(1) AIRCRAFT - HOST

CREW - HOST

EQUIPMENT - HOST

INSPECTOR(S) - ADVERSARY

(2) SYSTEM. THE INSPECTOR(S) REQUEST(S) AIRCRAFT AT STATED TIME FOR STATED ROUTE WITH STATED SENSORS, THE HOST COUNTRY PROVIDES AS REQUESTED AND GIVES THE INSPECTOR UNPROCESSED FILM ON LANDING.

(3) PROBLEMS

(A) WHAT SENSORS SHOULD BE USED AND THEIR INHERENT PERFORMANCE, PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS, OPERATING CONDITION, REQUIRED ANCILLARY EQUIPMENT AND INSTALLATION CHARACTERISTICS.

(B) POSSIBLE FRICTION IF FLIGHT CANNOT BE FLOWN AT TIMES REQUESTED.

(C) ENSURING THAT THE CREW IS TRAINED FOR AND EXPERIENCED IN FLYING PHOTOGRAPHIC RECONNAISSANCE AND/OR MAPPING MISSIONS AND IS ACTUALLY FOLLOWING THE DESIRED MISSION PROFILE AND FLIGHT PATH.

SECRET

PAGE 01 NATO 06599 04 OF 08 271925Z

67

ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 AEC-05 CIAE-00 H-01 INR-05 IO-10

L-02 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-03 PRS-01 SAJ-01

SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 RSC-01 NSC-05 MC-01

OES-03 /089 W

----- 007298

R 271530Z NOV 74

FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9019

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USDEL MBFR VIENNA

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

S E C R E T SECTION 4 OF 8 USNATO 6599

(D) EXPERIENCE IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS HAS SHOW THAT THE USE OF HOST COUNTRY TRANSPORT OR EQUIPMENT IS MOST UNSATISFACTORY AS IT OFFERS INFINITE POTENTIAL FOR INTER-FERENCE. IF, HOWEVER, HOST COUNTRY AIRCRAFT AND EQUIPMENT WERE USED THE INSPECTORS WOULD HAVE TO BE ABLE TO SELECT THE PHOTOGRAPHIC PARAMETERS, ENSURE THEIR BEING PROPERLY IMPLEMENTED IN TERMS OF CAMERA OPERATIONS, HAVE CONTROL OVER THE FILM BEFORE AND AFTER EXPOSURE IN THE CAMERA AND BE ABLE TO RECORD ON THE FILM CERTAIN CALIBRATION AND TEST INFORMATION BEFORE AND AFTER THE MISSION TO ENSURE THAT THE CAMERA PERFORMED AS ADVERTISED BY THE HOST.

B. OPTION 2

- (1) AIRCRAFT - HOST
- CREW - HOST
- EQUIPMENT ADVERSARY
- INSPECTORS(S)- ADVERSARY

(2) SYSTEM. THE INSPECTOR(S) REQUEST(S) AIRCRAFT AT STATED TIME FOR STATED ROUTE AND FIT(S) OWN SENSORS PRIOR TO SECRET

PAGE 02 NATO 06599 04 OF 08 271925Z

FLIGHT.

(3) PROBLEMS

(A) ADAPTION OF AIRCRAFT TO SENSORS. THE INSTALLATION OF ADVERSARY SENSORS IN THE HOST'S AIRCRAFT IS POSSIBLE BUT DIFFICULT IN PRACTICE, ESPECIALLY IF RECONNAISSANCE SENSORS RATHER THAN THE WIDELY STANDARDISED AERIAL MAPPING CAMERAS WERE TO BE USED. THE HOST AIRCRAFT WOULD HAVE TO BE EQUIPPED WITH PROPER MOUNTS, WINDOWS, FUELAGE OPENINGS, POWER SUPPLIES ETC. AN ADDITIONAL DIFFICULTY MIGHT BE SECURITY SENSITIVITY IF THE INSPECTING NATION SHOULD WISH TO USE HIGH PERFORMANCE, CLASSIFIED AIRBORNE RECONNAISSANCE SENSORS.

(B) POSSIBLE FRICTION IF FLIGHT CANNOT BE FLOWN AT TIMES REQUESTED.

(C) ENSURING CREW IS TRAINED FOR AND EXPERIENCED IN FLYING PHOTOGRAPHIC RECONNAISSANCE/MAPPING MISSIONS AND IS ACTUALLY FOLLOWING DESIRED MISSION PROFILE AND FLIGHT PATH.

C. OPTION 3

- (1) AIRCRAFT - ADVERSARY
- CREW - ADVERSARY
- EQUIPMENT -ADVERSARY
- INSPECTOR(S) -ADVERSARY
- OBSERVERS(S) - HOST

(2) SYSTEM. THE INSPECTOR(S) DECLARE(S) INTENTION OF FLYING, STATING MISSION, INVITE(S) OBSERVERS(S) AND OBTAIN(S) CLEARANCE.

(3) PROBLEMS

(A) ENSURING THAT ONLY AUTHORISED SENSORS ARE ABOARD THE AIRCRAFT. THIS IS VERY DIFFICULT TO IMPLEMENT WITH CERTAINTY. UNDOUBTEDLY THE GREATEST RISK TO THE HOST NATION'S SECURITY IS IN THE FIELD OF ELECTRONIC EMISSIONS AND POS-

ITIVE ASSURANCE THAT THE INSPECTING AIRCRAFT IS NOT
EQUIPPED WITH CONCEALED MONITORING DEVICES IS AT BEST DIFF-
ICULT AND TIME CONSUMING, AT WORST IMPOSSIBLE WITHOUT
TAKING THE PLANE ITSELF APART.

(B) ENSURING AIRCRAFT FOLLOWS PATH SUBMITTED.

COMPARISON OF OPTIONS

12.

SECRET

PAGE 03 NATO 06599 04 OF 08 271925Z

A. ADVERSARY INSPECTION (OPTION 3) IS PREFERRED BY SHAPE
(ANNEX C) AS TECHNICALLY MORE EFFICIENT AND LESS LIKELY TO
CAUSE FRICTION. THE US PAPER (ANNEX A) STATES THAT HOST
AIRCRAFT (OPTIONS 1 AND 2) WOULD NOT BE SUITABLE. OPTION 3
IS LIKELY TO BE THE MOST EFFECTIVE SOLUTION IN THAT THE
MAXIMUM NUMBER OF ELEMENTS (AIRCRAFT, SENSORS AND CREW) WOULD
BE UNDER THE INSPECTING TEAMS CONTROL. ALTHOUGH THERE
WOULD BE NO PRACTICAL WAY OF ENSURING THAT A WP INSECTING
TEAM COMPLIED WITH THE FLIGHT PATH LAID DOWN BY THE NATION(S)
WHOSE TERRITORY WAS BEING INSPECTED, ANY DEVIATION FROM FLIGHT
PATHS WOULD NORMALLY BE DETECTED IMMEDIATELY BY GROUND
SENSORS. THIS WOULD TEND TO DISCOURAGE DEVIATION FROM AGREED
FLIGHT PATHS BUT COULD NOT PROVIDE ANY GUARANTEE AGAINST
VIOLATIONS.

B. OPTION 1 WOULD ENSURE THAT THE AIRCRAFT FLEW ONLY ALONG
THE PERMITTED FLIGHT PATH AND CARRIED ONLY THE AUTHORISED
SENSORS. HOWEVER IT SUFFERS FROM THE DISADVANTAGE THAT
CONTRIVED UNSERVICEABILITY OF THE AVAILABLE AIRCRAFT COULD
BE USED TO FRUSTRATE VITAL INSPECTIONS AND EVEN GENUINE
UNSERVICEABILITY COULD PRODUCE A SOURCE OF FRICTION. IN
ADDITION STEPS WOULD HAVE TO BE TAKEN TO ASCERTAIN THE
PERFORMANCE OF THE SENSORS SUPPLIED BY THE HOST COUNTRY TO
ENSURE THAT THE EQUIPMENT IS ACTUALLY OPERATING IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE PHOTOGRAPHIC PARAMETERS SELECTED, THAT
THE FILM AND OTHER DATA RECORDS ARE NOT TAMPERED WITH AND
THAT "ACCIDENTAL" MALFUNCTIONS DO NOT OCCUR.

SECRET

PAGE 01 NATO 06599 05 OF 08 271953Z

67

ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 AEC-05 CIAE-00 H-01 INR-05 IO-10

L-02 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-03 PRS-01 SAJ-01

SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 RSC-01 NSC-05 MC-01

OES-03 /089 W

----- 007704

R 271530Z NOV 74
FM USMISSION NATO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9020
SECDEF WASHDC
INFO AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
USDEL MBFR VIENNA
USNMR SHAPE
USCINCEUR

S E C R E T SECTION 5 OF 8 USNATO 6599

C. OPTION 2 IS A SYSTEM WHICH WOULD MITIGATE SOME OF THE DIFFICULTIES PRESENTED BY USING THE OTHER SIDES' SENSORS, BUT IT IS LIKELY TO BE A PRACTICAL SOLUTION ONLY IF THE HOST IARCAFT ARE SUITABLY EQUIPPED FOR AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHIC MISSIONS, IF STANDARD MAPPING CAMERAS ARE USED OR IF HOST AIRCRAFT ARE SPECIALLY MODIFIED AND EQUIPPED TO ACCEPT NON-STANDARD RECONNAISSANCE CAMERAS WHICH THE INSPECTING NATION WISHES TO USE AND WHICH HAVE BEEN AGREED TO. CONTROL OF SENSORS WITH A LONG-RANGE, SUCH AS RADAR, COULD RAISE DIFFICULT PROBLEM(1). AS FOR OPTION 1, MISSIONS COULD BE THWARTED AT THE LAST MINUTE BY THE CONTRIVED OR REAL UNSERVICEABILITY OF THE AVAILABLE AIRCRAFT.

RESTRICTIONS ON INSPECTION

13.

A. THE RESTRICTIONS OUTLINED IN ANNEX B HAVE ALREADY BEEN AGREED WITHIN THE ALLIANCE.

SECRET

PAGE 02 NATO 06599 05 OF 08 271953Z

B. FOR THE PRESENT NEGOTIATING PURPOSES THIS OUTLINE OF RESTRICTIONS IS THOUGHT TO BE ADEQUATE, IT WILL HOWEVER BE NECESSARY IN DUE COURSE TO DRAW UP DETAILED RULES ON SUCH MATTERS AS:

- (1) TYPES OF EQUIPMENT;
- (2) OWNERSHI OF EQUIPMENT;
- (3) NUMBER OF INSPECTORS AND TASKS;
- ((4) NUMBER OF FLIGHTS;

(1) SEE PREVIOUS FOOTNOTE ON COMMUNICATION WITH THE EAST.

- (5) FLIGHT PROGRAMMING AND FLIGHT SAFETY;
- (6) RESTRICTED AREAS.

NONE OF THESE MATTERS RAISE ANY INSURMOUNTABLE TECHNICAL OR MILITARY PROBLEMS. THE AMOUNT OF VERIFICATION INFORMATION OBTAINED WILL DEPEND CRITICALLY ON WHAT DETAILED RULES ARE NEGOTIATED.

C. ONE TASK OF ANY MONITORING SYSTEM IS TO DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT RESIDUAL FORCE CEILINGS HAVE BEEN EXCEEDED. TO DO THIS IN EITHER PHASE I OR II WOULD REQUIRE SURVEILLANCE OF THE

ENTIRE NGA, WITH THE POSSIBLE EXCEPTION OF SOME RESTRICTED AREAS OF LIMITED SIZE AND NUMBER.

RECIPROCITY

14. ANY AGREED SYSTEM WILL NECESSARILY BE RECIPROCAL. MILITARY AND TECHNICALLY IT IS CONSIDERED THAT NATO HAS MORE TO GAIN THAN HAS THE WP FROM THE INTELLIGENCE POINT OF VIEW FROM AERIAL INSPECTION. FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF EFFECTIVE MONITORING, MAXIMUM FREEDOM OF AERIAL INSPECTION WOULD BE TO NATO'S NET ADVANTAGE WHATEVER THE SENSORS EMPLOYED. MILITARILY THEREFORE A SYSTEM WITH THE MINIMUM NECESSARY RESTRICTIONS WOULD BE TO THE ULTIMATE ADVANTAGE OF NATO.

CONCLUSIONS

15.

A. THE WORKING GROUP CONTINUE TO CONSIDER THAT AERIAL INSPECTION MUST BE REGARDED AS AN ADJUNCT TO, AND NOT AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR, A GROUND INSPECTION SYSTEM CONSISTING OF EITHER MOBILE OR STATIC MEANS OR A COMBINATION OF BOTH, AND TO OTHER MEANS OF MONITORING.

B. MILITARILY AND TECHNICALLY:

SECRET

PAGE 03 NATO 06599 05 OF 08 271953Z

(1) AN AERIAL INSPECTION SYSTEM, WITH MINIMUM RESTRICTIONS, OPERATING AS AN ADJUNCT TO GROUND, PARTICULARLY MOBILE TEAMS, WOULD BE TO THE ADVANTAGE OF NATO.

(2) AIR PHOTOGRAPHY WOULD BE ONE METHOD OF AERIAL INSPECTION WHICH WOULD GIVE MOST, IF NOT ALL, ALLIES A CHANCE TO PARTICIPATE.

(3) WHATEVER THE SYSTEM, THE MORE ELEMENTS THAT ARE UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE COUNTRY (COUNTRIES) BEING INSPECTED, THE MORE OPPORTUNITY THERE WOULD BE FOR A VIOLATOR TO FRUSTRATE THE SYSTEM AT A VITAL TIME.

(4) EACH OF THE SYSTEMS OF AERIAL INSPECTION EXAMINED HAS DIFFERENT ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES FOR EACH SIDE:

(A) A SYSTEM IN WHICH THE AIRCRAFT, SENSORS AND CREW WERE PROVIDED BY THE SIDE CARRYING OUT THE INSPECTION (OPTION 3) WOULD BE THE MOST EFFECTIVE FROM THEIR POINT OF VIEW. THE COUNTRY/COUNTRIES TO BE INSPECTED WOULD NO DOUBT SPECIFY FLIGHT REGULATIONS FOR THE INSPECTING AIRCRAFT BUT THERE COULD BE NO GUARANTEE THAT ACCIDENTAL OR DELIBERATE DEVIATIONS FROM STIPULATED FLIGHT PATHS WOULD NOT OCCUR.

(B) A SYSTEM IN WHICH THE AIRCRAFT, SENSORS AND CREW WERE PROVIDED BY THE NATION(S) BEING INSPECTED (OPTION 1) WOULD ENSURE THAT FLIGHT REGULATIONS WERE OBEYED BUT COULD BE USED TO THWART THE INSPECTING SIDE BY SUCH METHODS AS CONTRIVED OR REAL UNSERVICEABILITY OF AIRCRAFT OR CONTRIVED OR REAL "ACCIDENTS" TO THE SENSORS OR FILMS;

(C) A SYSTEM IN WHICH THE AIRCRAFT AND CREW WERE PROVIDED BY THE NATION(S) BEING INSPECTED, BUT UNDER WHICH

THE SENSORS WERE PROVIDED BY THE INSPECTION TEAM (OPTION 2) AND WOULD MEET SOME, BUT NOT ALL, OF THE DISADVANTAGES OF THE OTHER TWO OPTIONS. HOWEVER SUCH A SYSTEM COULD STILL BE FRUSTRATED BY THE OTHER SIDE WHICH WOULD CONTROL AND THE AIRCRAFT USED.

(5) ADVERSARY INSPECTION (OPTION 3), WITH THE HOST PROVIDING OBSERVERS ONLY WOULD BE THE MOST TECHNICALLY EFFICIENT SYSTEM.

16. SINCE THE POLITICAL ACCEPTABILITY OF AERIAL INSPECTION IS OF PRIMARY IMPORTANCE, IT IS ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT THAT THE TECHNICAL AND OPERATIONAL ASPECTS OF AIRBORNE INSPECTION BE FORMULATED SO THAT THEIR CONTRIBUTION TO
SECRET

PAGE 04 NATO 06599 05 OF 08 271953Z

VERIFICATION IS READILY UNDERSTOOD WHEN THE PROS AND CONS OF SPECIFIC DESIREABLE OUTCOMES OF NEGOTIATIONS ARE EVALUATED. SPECIFICALLY, MAXIMUM ACCEPTABLE OPERATING RESTRICTIONS, (E.G. PRESCRIBED PRIOR NOTIFICATION, PERMITTED FLIGHT PATH, ALTITUDE AND FREQUENCY OF COVERAGE), BEYOND WHICH AIRBORNE INSPECTION WOULD CONTRIBUTE VERY LITTLE TO MONITORING OR TO FILLING INTELLIGENCE GAPS BEFORE NEGOTIATING POSITIONS ARE DEVELOPED.

SECRET

PAGE 01 NATO 06599 06 OF 08 272030Z

67

ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 AEC-05 CIAE-00 H-01 INR-05 IO-10

L-02 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-03 PRS-01 SAJ-01

SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 RSC-01 NSC-05 MC-01

OES-03 /089 W

----- 008175

R 271530Z NOV 74

FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9021

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USDEL MBFR VIENNA

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

S E C R E T SECTION 6 OF 8 USNATO 6599

ANNEX A TO

AC/276-WP(74)9(4TH REVISE)

SUMMARY OF DETAILS GIVEN IN PAGES 51-57 OF
US NATO(POL)/OUT/NS/73-121

1. PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE - FIELD TEST 15. IN 1968 -
TEST WAS CARRIED OUT IN SOUTHERN ENGLAND. SMALL-SCALE, WIDE
AREA PHOTOGRAPHY WAS USED FIRST TO LOCATE MILITARY INSTALL-
ATIONS. LARGE-SCALE PHOTOGRAPHS WERE THEN TAKEN OF THESE
INSTALLATIONS FOR DETAILED ANALYSIS. FLIGHTS, WEATHER PERMI-
TTING, WERE NORMALLY CARRIED OUT AT ABOVE 40,000 FEET. THIS
TEST SHOWED:

(A) AERIAL SURVEILLANCE IS HEAVILY DEPENDENT ON A GOOD
ATA BASE;

(B) GOOD RESULTS WERE OBTAINED ON LOCATING BASES AND
IDENTIFYING THEIR FUNCTION;

(C) MILITARY UNITSWITH LARGE EQUIPMENTS, E.G. TANKS,
SECRET

PAGE 02 NATO 06599 06 OF 08 272030Z

WERE MOST EASILY IDENTIFIED;

(D) PHOTOGRAPHIC IDENTIFICATION AVERAGED ABOUT 80 PER
CENT; FOR TANK UNITS ERROR WAS AS LITTLE AS 18 PER
CENT BUT FOR SOME ARTILLERY UNITS ERROR WAS AS HIGH
AS 83 PER CENT.

2. SYSTEMS

(A) SLR (SIDE LOOKING RADAR), HAS GREATER RANGE THAN
PHOTOGRAPHY AND IS NOT AFFECTED BY WEATHER BUT IT
CAN ONLY IDENTIFY LARGE-SCALE MOVEMENT.

(B) IR (INFRA-RED), HAS HIGHER RESOLUTION THAN SLR AND
CAN WORK AT NIGHT. HOWEVER, IT IS LIMITED BY WEATHER
AND HAS POORER RESOLUTION AND COVERAGE THAN PHOTOGRAPHY.

3. OPERATING FACTORS. THE MAIN DISADVANTAGE OF AERIAL
RECONNAISSANCE IS ITS RELIANCE ON FAVOURABLE WEATHER. ITS
ADVANTAGES INCLUDE WIDE AREA COVERAGE, QUICK REACTION AND
QUICK RETURN OF DATA FOR INTERPRETATION.

4. AIRCRAFT

(A) SPECIALIST AIRCRAFT AVAILABLE TO THE US ARE THE U-2
AND SR-71. BOTH FLY ABOVE NORMAL AIR TRAFFIC. FOR
FOR VARIOUS REASONS THE U-2 IS CONSIDERED MORE SUITABLE
FOR VERIFICATION PURPOSES. TWO U-2 WOULD BE REQUIRED.
TWO 7-2 WOULD BE REQUIRED.

(B) SPECIALLY EQUIPPED C-130 AIRCRAFT COULD CARRY OUT THE
TASK AT 40,000 FEET AND BELOW. TWO AIRCRAFT WOULD BE REQUIRED.

5. OPERATING. THE PAPER SUGGEST:

(A) THE AIRCRAFT SHOULD BE BASED ON AVAILABLE BASES
IN WESTERN EUROPE.

(B) IN THE CASE OF C-130, CREWS COULD BE ALLIED.

(C) TASKING AND ANALYSIS WOULD BE BY AN ALLIED ORGANIZATION.

(D) USE OF HOST COUNTRY AIRCRAFT WOULD NOT BE SUITABLE.

6. POSSIBLE OPTIONS. FIVE OPTIONS ARE DISCUSSED:

(A) FLIGHT OF FANCY. THIS WOULD ALLOW FLIGHTS WHERE AND WHEN REQUIRED WITHIN AIR SAFETY LIMITS.

(B) CHALLENGE GAMBIT. THIS ALLOWS AN AGREED NUMBER OF FLIGHTS IN A YEAR BASICALLY AS REQUIRED BUT WITH SOME RESTRICTIONS.

SECRET

PAGE 03 NATO 06599 06 OF 08 272030Z

(C) RESTRICTIVE CASE. SIMILAR TO THE CHALLENGE GAMBIT.

(D) MORE RESTRICTIVE CASE. SIMILAR AGAIN BUT WITH VERY FEW FLIGHTS ALLOWED.

(E) MOST RESTRICTIVE CASE. TOKEN FLIGHTS OVER STRICTLY LIMITED AREAS.

ANNEX B TO

AC/276-WP(74)9(4TH REVISE)

EXTRACT FROM PAGE 4 OF AC/276-D(72)1

RESTRICTIONS ON AIRBORNE INSPECTION. MEDIUM-LEVEL AIR PHOTOGRAPHY AND FLIGHT PROGRAMMING

1. AIRBORNE INSPECTIONS(1) SHOULD ONLY BE ALLOWED IF:

(A) THE AIRCRAFT BELONGS TO THE INSPECTED COUNTRY OR FORCES.

(B) THE FLIGHTS ARE ORIGINATED IN THE INSPECTED COUNTRY.

(C) ADVANCE NOTICE OF THE FLIGHTS IS GIVEN (MINIMUM NOTICE IS 24 HOURS).

(D) THE FLIGHTS ARE CARRIED OUT ONLY ON PRESCRIBED ROUTES AND ALTITUDES.

(E) THE INSPECTORS ARE ESCORTED (BY CREW OF INSPECTED FORCES).

(F) TYPE OF AIRCRAFT, FREQUENCY AND TIMING OF FLIGHTS ARE LIMITED.

2. MEDIUM-LEVEL PHOTOGRAPHY BY AIR COULD BE ACCEPTABLE BUT THERE ARE SUPPLEMENTARY PROBLEMS THAT NEED TO BE RESOLVED, SUCH AS THE OWNERSHIP OF THE AIRCRAFT AND OF THE PHOTOGRAPHIC EQUIPMENT.

(1) NOTE THE WORKING GROUP HERE WAS CONSIDERING PRINCIPALLY LOW-LEVEL VISUAL INSPECTION. MEDIUM-LEVEL AIR PHOTOGRAPHY IS COVERED IN THE SECOND PARAGRAPH.

SECRET

PAGE 01 NATO 06599 07 OF 08 272142Z

67

ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 AEC-05 CIAE-00 H-01 INR-05 IO-10

L-02 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-03 PRS-01 SAJ-01

SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 RSC-01 NSC-05 MC-01

OES-03 /089 W

----- 009384

R 271530Z NOV 74

FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9022

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USDEL MBFR VIENNA

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

S E C R E T SECTION 7 OF 8 USNATO 6599

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS ALLIED POWER EUROPE
B7010, SHAPE, BELGIUM

1000.1/20-5-4/74

SUBJECT: MBFR VERIFICATION - AIRBORNE PHOTOGRAPHY

REFERENCE: AC/276(SGVE)-WP/3 DATED 24TH JULY, 1972

1. THE PAPER AT REFERENCE ASKS SHAPE TO EXAMINE TWO ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEMS WHICH HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED AS REQUIRING CLOSER STUDY AS A PRELIMINARY TO WORK BY A PANEL OF EXPERTS ON THE SUBJECT OF AIRBORNE PHOTOGRAPHIC ARRANGEMENTS WHICH MAY FORM PART OF A POSSIBLE MUTUALLY AGREED VERIFICATION PROCEDURE OF AN MBFR. THE TWO ASPECTS ARE:
(A) THE MAINTENANCE OF THE INTEGRITY OF AIR SPACE.

SECRET

PAGE 02 NATO 06599 07 OF 08 272142Z

(B) THE PRACTICABILITY OF ROUTING OF THE AIRCRAFT TO ENSURE THAT THE RESTRICTED INSTALLATIONS AND AREAS REMAIN PROTECTED.

2. AS A PRELIMINARY TO WORK ON THESE TWO ASPECTS, SHAPE HAS REVIEWED THE PRINCIPLES WHICH IT CONSIDERED IN FORMULATING THE REPLY TO THE SUB-GROUP'S QUESTIONNAIRE IN 1971 WITH PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON AIRBORNE PHOTOGRAPHIC CONSIDERATIONS ONLY. IN THIS SHAPE IS ONLY ABLE TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT FORCES, FACILITIES AND INSTALLATION WHICH ARE UNDER SACEUR'S PEACETIME CONTROL.

3. IN GENERAL IT IS CONSIDERED THAT ANY RESTRICTIONS SOUGHT BY ONE SIDE IS LIKELY TO BE RECIPROCATED BY THE OTHER AND THAT THE LEAST RESTRICTIVE APPROACH THAT CAN BE ACCEPTED MAY WELL BE TO THE ULTIMATE ADVANTAGE OF NATO. FROM AN INTELLIGENCE POINT OF VIEW, AN EQUITABLE INSPECTION SYSTEM MIGHT WELL RESULT IN A GREATER NET GAIN IN INTELLIGENCE FOR NATO THAN FOR THE WARSAW PACT.

4. OWNERSHIP OF INSPECTING AIRCRAFT. ON BALANCE THE MOST SATISFACTORY ARRANGEMENT WOULD BE FOR THE INSPECTING PARTY TO USE ITS OWN AIRCRAFT DURING PHOTOGRAPHIC VERIFICATION FLIGHTS OVER THE TERRITORY OF THE OTHER ALLIANCE. THIS WOULD ELIMINATE ALL SOURCES OF FRICTION ON ACCOUNT OF TECHNICAL DELAYS DUE TO SERVICEABILITY OR WEATHER, OPERATION OF EQUIPMENT, PROCESSING OF PHOTOGRAPHS, ETC. AGAIN ON BALANCE THERE IS LITTLE MERIT IN ATTEMPTING TO STANDARDIZE ON EQUIPMENT (E.G. CAMERAS, DEFINITION, ARRAYS AND COVERAGE) WHICH COULD LEAD TO FURTHER FRICTION AND DISPUTE DURING INSPECTIONS.

5. TYPE OF AIRCRAFT. IT IS NOT CONSIDERED THAT AIR PHOTOGRAPHIC FACTORS NEED AFFECT ANY STIPULATIONS AS TO TYPE OF AIRCRAFT. CONSIDERATION OF OTHER ASPECTS, E. G. SPEED AND HEIGHT FOR RADAR CONTROL OF INSPECTING FLIGHT AND THE INCLUSION OF AN OBSERVER FROM THE TERRITORY BEING INSPECTED, MAY MAKE A LOW PERFORMANCE, PROPELLOR-DRIVEN TYPE OF AIRCRAFT PREFERABLE.

SECRET

PAGE 03 NATO 06599 07 OF 08 272142Z

6. LIMITATIONS ON OVERFLYING. AREAS OVER WHICH THE ALLIES WOULD WISH TO RESTRICT OVERFLYING SHOULD BE KEPT TO A MINIMUM. AS FAR AS SHAPE IS CONCERNED THERE ARE NO AREAS OVER WHICH FLYING SHOULD BE PERMANENTLY RESTRICTED. IT MAY BE NECESSARY TO DELINEATE RESTRICTED AREAS ON A TEMPORARY BASIS TO COVER SUCH ACTIVITIES AS TACTICAL EXERCISES. HOWEVER, THE DECLARATION OF PERMANENTLY OR TEMPORARILY RESTRICTED AREAS SHOULD BE HELD TO A MINIMUM FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS:

(A) THE DECLARATION WOULD ADVERTISE THE LOCATION OF SENSITIVE AREAS.

(B) PHOTOGRAPHY IN SUCH AREAS WOULD STILL BE POSSIBLE BY SATELLITE OR CLANDESTINE MEANS.

(C) INEVITABLE, UNDESIRABLE RECIPROCAL RESTRICTIONS WOULD RESULT.

7. ELECTRONIC EMISSIONS. IT SEEMS POSSIBLE THAT THE GREATEST RISK TO THE INSPECTED NATION'S SECURITY IS IN THE FIELD OF ELECTRONIC EMISSIONS, E.G. ECM/ECCM, RADIO, RADAR. PRE-FLIGHT INSPECTIONS OF A LARGE AIRCRAFT TO PROVIDE POSITIVE ASSURANCE THAT NO APPROPRIATE MONITORING DEVICES WERE BEING CARRIED MAY BE IMPRACTICAL IN AN ACCEPTABLE

TIEM-SCALE. SUCH MONITORING ACTIVITIES COULD BE CARRIED OUT WITHOUT THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE INSPECTED NATIONS'S OBSERVER IN THE AIRCRAFT. IT WOULD THEREFORE SEEM A MORE PRACTICAL APPROACH TO INSIST THAT THE FLIGHT WAS PROPERLY WARNED AND CLEARED, SAY 48. HOURS IN ADVANCE, AND TO ENSURE THAT ALL SENSITIVE ELECTRONIC EMISSIONS WITHIN RANGE OF THE INSPECTING AIRCRAFT WERE STOPPED FOR THE PERIOD OF THE FLIGHT.

8. MAINTENANCE OF INTEGRITY OF AIRSPACE. THE POINT OF ORIGIN OF THE INSPECTING FLIGHT IS OF NO IMPORTANCE. THE FOLLOWING PROVISIONS ARE NECESSARY:

- (A) THE FLIGHT MUST BE PROPERLY CLEARED.
 - (B) THE AIRCRAFT MUST CARRY A HOST NATION'S OOBERVER.
 - (C) THE FLIGHT MUST BE FLOWN IN A HEIGHT ENVELOPE CHOSE BY THE INSPECTING NATION.
 - (D) THE HIGHT BAND PERMITTED SHOULD BE RESTRICTED ONLY BY CONSIDERATION:
 - (1) AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL.
 - (2) AIR SAFETY.
- SECRET

PAGE 04 NATO 06599 07 OF 08 272142Z

(3) ENSURING RADAR SURVEILLANCE BY THE INSPECTED NATION AS A VERIFICATION THAT THE PLANNED ROUTE WAS IN FACT FLOWN.

SECRET

PAGE 01 NATO 06599 08 OF 08 272142Z

67
ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 AEC-05 CIAE-00 H-01 INR-05 IO-10

L-02 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-03 PRS-01 SAJ-01

SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 RSC-01 NSC-05 MC-01

OES-03 /089 W
----- 009369

R 271530Z NOV 74
FM USMISSION NATO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9023
SECDEF WASHDC
INFO AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
USDEL MBFR VIENNA
USNMR SHAPE
USCINCEUR

S E C R E T SECTION 8 OF 8 USNATO 6599

9. AIRSPACE OF FRG. (1) IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THE INTEGRITY OF THE AIRSPACE OF THE FRG IS LEGALLY THE RESPONSIBILITY OF POWERS UNDER THE FOUR POWER AGREEMENTS FOLLOWING THE 1939-1945 WAR. IN REACHING AGREEMENT ON AIRBORNE PHOTOGRAPHIC OVER-FLIGHTS IT WOULD SEEM NECESSARY TO TAKE THIS INTO ACCOUNT INCLUDING THE FRENCH POSITION SINCE FRENCH FORCES ARE STATIONED IN THE FRG UNDER BILATERAL ARRANGEMENTS.

10. PRACTICABILITY OF ROUTING TO PROTECT RESTRICTED INSTALLATIONS AND AREAS. AS INDICATED AT PARAGRAPH 6 ABOVE THERE ARE NO INSTALLATIONS OR AREAS OVER WHICH SHAPE WOULD WISH PERMANENTLY TO RESTRICT FLYING. HOWEVER, IT WOULD SEEM FROM NATIONAL REPLIES TO THE QUESTIONNAIRE IN 1971 THAT SOME NATIONS WITHIN THE GUIDELINES AREA HAVE AREAS WHICH ARE NATIONALLY SENSITIVE. AN ANALYSIS WOULD NEED TO BE MADE, WHEN THESE AREAS ARE SPECIFIED, AS TO THE PRACTICABILITY OF ROUTING AIRCRAFT TO PROTECT THESE AREAS.

SECRET

PAGE 02 NATO 06599 08 OF 08 272142Z

FOOTNOTE BY MBFR WORKING GROUP:

(1) THE GERMAN DELEGATION RESERVES THE RIGHT OF FURTHER EXAMINATION AND COMMENT ON THE STATEMENT CONTAINED IN THIS PARAGRAPH
END TEXT
MCAULIFFE

SECRET

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 11 JUN 1999
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: n/a
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 27 NOV 1974
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: golinofr
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1974ATO06599
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: 11652 GDS
Errors: n/a
Film Number: n/a
From: NATO
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1974/newtext/t19741185/abbryysq.tel
Line Count: 1002
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE
Office: n/a
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 19
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: A) USNATO 6314; B) STATE 254639;
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: golinofr
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 27 MAR 2002
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <27 MAR 2002 by kelleyw0>; APPROVED <28 MAY 2002 by golinofr>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: MBFR: WG PAPER ON AERIAL INSPECTION
TAGS: PARM, NATO
To: STATE
SECDEF INFO BONN
LONDON
MBFR VIENNA
USNMR SHAPE
USCINCEUR
Type: TE

Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005